U.S. Supreme
Court
PARIS ADULT THEATRE I V. SLATON, 413 U.S. 49 (1973)
413 U.S. 49
Respondents sued under Georgia civil law to enjoin the
exhibiting by petitioners of two allegedly obscene films. There was no prior
restraint. In a jury-waived trial, the trial court (which did not require
"expert" affirmative evidence of obscenity) viewed the films and
thereafter dismissed the complaints on the ground that the display of the films
in commercial theaters to consenting adult audiences (reasonable precautions
having been taken to exclude minors) was "constitutionally
permissible." The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the films
constituted "hard core" pornography not within the protection of the
First Amendment.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners are two Atlanta, Georgia, movie theaters and their
owners and managers, operating in the [413 U.S. 49, 51] style of
"adult" theaters. On December 28, 1970, respondents, the local state
district attorney and the solicitor for the local state trial court, filed
civil complaints in that court alleging that petitioners were exhibiting to the
public for paid admission two allegedly obscene films, contrary to Georgia Code
Ann. 26-2101. 1 The
two films in question, "Magic Mirror" and "It All Comes Out in
the End," depict sexual conduct characterized [413 U.S. 49,
52] by the Georgia Supreme Court as "hard core
pornography" leaving "little to the imagination."
Respondents' complaints, made on behalf of the State of Georgia,
demanded that the two films be declared obscene and that petitioners be
enjoined from exhibiting the films. The exhibition of the films was not
enjoined, but a temporary injunction was granted ex parte by the local trial
court, restraining petitioners from destroying the films or removing them from
the jurisdiction. Petitioners were further ordered to have one print each of
the films in court on January 13, 1971, together with the proper viewing
equipment.
On January 13, 1971, 15 days after the proceedings began, the
films were produced by petitioners at a jury-waived trial. Certain photographs,
also produced at trial, were stipulated to portray the single entrance to both
Paris Adult Theatre I and Paris Adult Theatre II as it appeared at the time of
the complaints. These photographs show a conventional, inoffensive theater
entrance, without any pictures, but with signs indicating that the theaters
exhibit "Atlanta's Finest Mature Feature Films." On the door itself
is a sign saying: "Adult Theater - You must be 21 and able to prove it. If
viewing the nude body offends you, Please Do Not Enter."
The two films were exhibited to the trial court. The only other
state evidence was testimony by criminal investigators that they had paid
admission to see the films and that nothing on the outside of the theater
indicated the full nature of what was shown. In particular, nothing indicated
that the films depicted - as they did - scenes of simulated fellatio,
cunnilingus, and group sex intercourse. There was no evidence presented that
minors had ever entered the theaters. Nor was there evidence presented that
petitioners had a systematic policy of barring minors, apart from posting signs
at the entrance. On April 12, 1971, the trial judge dismissed [413
U.S. 49, 53] respondents' complaints. He assumed "that obscenity is
established," but stated:
.
"It appears to the Court that the display of these films in
a commercial theatre, when surrounded by requisite notice to the public of
their nature and by reasonable protection against the exposure of these films
to minors, is constitutionally permissible."
.
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court unanimously reversed. It
assumed that the adult theaters in question barred minors and gave a full
warning to the general public of the nature of the films shown, but held that
the films were without protection under the First Amendment. Citing the opinion
of this Court in United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971),
the Georgia court stated that "the sale and delivery of obscene material
to willing adults is not protected under the first amendment." The Georgia
court also held Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969),
to be inapposite since it did not deal with "the commercial distribution
of pornography, but with the right of Stanley to possess, in the privacy of his
home, pornographic films." 228 Ga. 343, 345, 185 S. E. 2d 768, 769 (1971).
After viewing the films, the Georgia Supreme Court held that their exhibition
should have been enjoined, stating:
.
"The films in this case leave little to the imagination. It
is plain what they purport to depict, that is, conduct of the most salacious
character. We hold that these films are also hard core pornography, and the
showing of such films should have been enjoined since their exhibition is not
protected by the first amendment." Id., at 347, 185 S. E. 2d, at 770.
.
I
It should be clear from the
outset that we do not undertake to tell the States what they must do, but [413
U.S. 49, 54] rather to define the area in which they may chart their own
course in dealing with obscene material. This Court has consistently held that
obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment as a limitation on the
state police power by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Miller v. California,
ante, at 23-25; Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229,
230 (1972); United States v. Reidel, supra, at 354; Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476,
485 (1957).
Georgia case law permits a civil
injunction of the exhibition of obscene materials. See 1024 Peachtree Corp. v.
Slaton, 228 Ga. 102, 184 S. E. 2d 144 (1971); Walter v. Slaton, 227 Ga. 676,
182 S. E. 2d 464 (1971); Evans Theatre Corp v. Slaton, 227 Ga. 377, 180 S. E.
2d 712 (1971). While this procedure is civil in nature, and does not directly
involve the state criminal statute proscribing exhibition of obscene material, 2 the
Georgia case law permitting civil injunction does adopt the definition of
"obscene materials" used by the criminal statute. 3 Today,
in Miller v. California, supra, we have [413 U.S. 49, 55] sought to clarify the
constitutional definition of obscene material subject to regulation by the
States, and we vacate and remand this case for reconsideration in light of
Miller.
This is not to be read as
disapproval of the Georgia civil procedure employed in this case, assuming the
use of a constitutionally acceptable standard for determining what is
unprotected by the First Amendment. On the contrary, such a procedure provides
an exhibitor or purveyor of materials the best possible notice, prior to any
criminal indictments, as to whether the materials are unprotected by the First
Amendment and subject to state regulation. 4 See
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436,
441 -444 (1957). Here, Georgia imposed no restraint on the
exhibition of the films involved in this case until after a full adversary
proceeding and a final judicial determination by the Georgia Supreme Court that
the materials were constitutionally unprotected. 5 Thus
the standards of Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410,
417 (1971); Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139,
141 -142 (1968); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 -59
(1965), and Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, supra, at 443-445, were met. Cf.
United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363,
367 -369 (1971) (opinion of WHITE, J.). [413 U.S. 49,
56]
Nor was it error to fail to
require "expert" affirmative evidence that the materials were obscene
when the materials themselves were actually placed in evidence. United States
v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577, 579-586 (CA5 1973); id., at 586-588 (Ainsworth, J.,
concurring); id., at 588-589 (Clark, J., concurring); United States v. Wild,
422 F.2d 34, 35-36 (CA2 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986 (1971);
Kahm v. United States, 300 F.2d 78, 84 (CA5), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962);
State v. Amato, 49 Wis. 2d 638, 645, 183 N. W. 2d 29, 32 (1971), cert. denied
sub nom. Amato v. Wisconsin, 404 U.S. 1063 (1972).
See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147,
172 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting); United States v.
Brown, 328 F. Supp. 196, 199 (ED Va. 1971). The films, obviously, are the best
evidence of what they represent. 6 "In
the cases in which this Court has decided obscenity questions since Roth, it
has regarded the materials as sufficient in themselves for the determination of
the question." Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,
465 (1966). [413 U.S. 49, 57]
II
We categorically disapprove the
theory, apparently adopted by the trial judge, that obscene, pornographic films
acquire constitutional immunity from state regulation simply because they are
exhibited for consenting adults only. This holding was properly rejected by the
Georgia Supreme Court. Although we have often pointedly recognized the high
importance of the state interest in regulating the exposure of obscene materials
to juveniles and unconsenting adults, see Miller v. California, ante, at 18-20;
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S., at 567
; Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767,
769 (1967), this Court has never declared these to be the only
legitimate state interests permitting regulation of obscene material. The
States have a long-recognized legitimate interest in regulating the use of
obscene material in local commerce and in all places of public accommodation,
as long as these regulations do not run afoul of specific constitutional
prohibitions. See United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, supra, at 376-377
(opinion of WHITE, J.); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S., at 354
-356. Cf. United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, supra, at 378
(STEWART, J., concurring). "In an unbroken series of cases extending over
a long stretch of this Court's history, it has been accepted as a postulate
that 'the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene
publications.' [Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
716 (1931)]." Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, supra, at 440.
In particular, we hold that
there are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of
commercialized obscenity, even assuming it is feasible to enforce effective
safeguards against exposure to juveniles and to passersby. 7
[413 U.S. 49, 58] Rights and interests "other
than those of the advocates are involved." Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622,
642 (1951). These include the interest of the public in the quality
of life and the total community environment, the tone of commerce in the great
city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself. The Hill-Link Minority
Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography indicates that there is
at least an arguable correlation between obscene material and crime. 8 Quite
[413 U.S. 49, 59] apart from sex crimes, however,
there remains one problem of large proportions aptly described by Professor
Bickel:
.
"It concerns the tone of the society, the mode, or to use
terms that have perhaps greater currency, the style and quality of life, now
and in the future. A man may be entitled to read an obscene book in his room,
or expose himself indecently there . . . . We should protect his privacy. But
if he demands a right to obtain the books and pictures he wants in the market,
and to foregather in public places - discreet, if you will, but accessible to
all - with others who share his tastes, then to grant him his right is to
affect the world about the rest of us, and to impinge on other privacies. Even
supposing that each of us can, if he wishes, effectively avert the eye and stop
the ear (which, in truth, we cannot), what is commonly read and seen and heard
and done intrudes upon us all, want it or not." 22 The Public Interest
25-26 (Winter 1971). 9 (Emphasis
added.)
.
As Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated, there is a "right of
the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society . . .," [413
U.S. 49, 60] Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,
199 (1964) (dissenting opinion). 10 See
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413,
457 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,
256 -257 (1952); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 -88
(1949).
But, it is argued, there are no scientific data which
conclusively demonstrate that exposure to obscene material adversely affects
men and women or their society. It is urged on behalf of the petitioners that,
absent such a demonstration, any kind of state regulation is
"impermissible." We reject this argument. It is not for us to resolve
empirical uncertainties underlying state legislation, save in the exceptional
case where that legislation plainly impinges upon rights protected by the
Constitution itself. 11 MR.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, speaking for the Court in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
642 -643 (1968), said: "We do not demand of legislatures
`scientifically certain criteria of legislation.' Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104,
110 ." Although there is no conclusive proof of a connection
between antisocial behavior [413 U.S. 49, 61] and obscene material,
the legislature of Georgia could quite reasonably determine that such a
connection does or might exist. In deciding Roth, this Court implicitly
accepted that a legislature could legitimately act on such a conclusion to
protect "the social interest in order and morality." Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S., at 485
, quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942) (emphasis added in Roth). 12
From the beginning of civilized societies, legislators and
judges have acted on various unprovable assumptions. Such assumptions underlie
much lawful state regulation of commercial and business affairs. See Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,
730 (1963); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S., at 632
-633, 641-645; Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron
& Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525,
536 -537 (1949). The same is true of the federal securities and
antitrust laws and a host of federal regulations. See SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
186 -195 (1963); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 99 -103
(1946); North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686,
705 -707 (1946), and cases cited. See also Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432,
436 -437 (1925), and Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308,
322 (1913). On the basis of these assumptions both Congress and
state legislatures have, for example, drastically restricted associational
rights by adopting antitrust laws, and have strictly regulated public
expression by issuers of and dealers in securities, profit sharing
"coupons," and "trading stamps," [413 U.S. 49,
62] commanding what they must and must not publish and announce. See
Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553,
597 -602 (1936); Merrick v. N. W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568,
584 -589 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559,
567 -568 (1917); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539,
548 -552 (1917); Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369,
383 -386 (1916); Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342,
363 -368 (1916). Understandably those who entertain an absolutist
view of the First Amendment find it uncomfortable to explain why rights of
association, speech, and press should be severely restrained in the marketplace
of goods and money, but not in the marketplace of pornography.
Likewise, when legislatures and administrators act to protect
the physical environment from pollution and to preserve our resources of
forests, streams, and parks, they must act on such imponderables as the impact
of a new highway near or through an existing park or wilderness area. See
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
417 -420 (1971). Thus, 18 (a) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1968, 23 U.S.C. 138, and the Department of Transportation Act of 1966, as
amended, 82 Stat. 824, 49 U.S.C. 1653 (f), have been described by Mr. Justice
Black as "a solemn determination of the highest law-making body of this
Nation that the beauty and health-giving facilities of our parks are not to be
taken away for public roads without hearings, factfindings, and policy
determinations under the supervision of a Cabinet officer . . . ."
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, supra, at 421 (separate opinion joined by
BRENNAN, J.). The fact that a congressional directive reflects unprovable
assumptions about what is good for the people, including imponderable aesthetic
assumptions, is not a sufficient reason to find that statute unconstitutional. [413 U.S.
49, 63]
If we accept the unprovable assumption that a complete education
requires the reading of certain books, see Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
245 (1968), and Johnson v. New York State Education Dept., 449 F.2d
871, 882-883 (CA2 1971) (dissenting opinion), vacated and remanded to consider
mootness, 409 U.S. 75 (1972),
id., at 76-77 (MARSHALL, J., concurring), and the well nigh universal belief
that good books, plays, and art lift the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the
human personality, and develop character, can we then say that a state
legislature may not act on the corollary assumption that commerce in obscene
books, or public exhibitions focused on obscene conduct, have a tendency to exert
a corrupting and debasing impact leading to antisocial behavior? "Many of
these effects may be intangible and indistinct, but they are nonetheless
real." American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, supra, at 103. Mr. Justice
Cardozo said that all laws in Western civilization are "guided by a robust
common sense . . . ." Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,
590 (1937). The sum of experience, including that of the past two
decades, affords an ample basis for legislatures to conclude that a sensitive,
key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community welfare,
and the development of human personality, can be debased and distorted by crass
commercial exploitation of sex. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits a State
from reaching such a conclusion and acting on it legislatively simply because
there is no conclusive evidence or empirical data.
It is argued that individual "free will" must govern,
even in activities beyond the protection of the First Amendment and other
constitutional guarantees of privacy, and that government cannot legitimately
impede an individual's desire to see or acquire obscene plays, movies, and
books. We do indeed base our society on [413 U.S. 49, 64] certain assumptions that
people have the capacity for free choice. Most exercises of individual free
choice - those in politics, religion, and expression of ideas - are explicitly
protected by the Constitution. Totally unlimited play for free will, however,
is not allowed in our or any other society. We have just noted, for example,
that neither the First Amendment nor "free will" precludes States
from having "blue sky" laws to regulate what sellers of securities
may write or publish about their wares. See supra, at 61-62. Such laws are to
protect the weak, the uninformed, the unsuspecting, and the gullible from the
exercise of their own volition. Nor do modern societies leave disposal of
garbage and sewage up to the individual "free will," but impose
regulation to protect both public health and the appearance of public places.
States are told by some that they must await a "laissez-faire" market
solution to the obscenity-pornography problem, paradoxically "by people
who have never otherwise had a kind word to say for laissez-faire,"
particularly in solving urban, commercial, and environmental pollution
problems. See I. Kristol, On the Democratic Idea in America 37 (1972).
The States, of course, may follow such a "laissez-faire"
policy and drop all controls on commercialized obscenity, if that is what they
prefer, just as they can ignore consumer protection in the marketplace, but
nothing in the Constitution compels the States to do so with regard to matters falling
within state jurisdiction. See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S., at 357
; Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S., at 462
(WHITE, J., dissenting). "We do not sit as a super-legislature
to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic
problems, business affairs, or social conditions." Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
482 (1965). See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S., at 731
; Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421,
423 (1952). [413 U.S. 49, 65]
It is asserted, however, that standards for evaluating state
commercial regulations are inapposite in the present context, as state
regulation of access by consenting adults to obscene material violates the
constitutionally protected right to privacy enjoyed by petitioners' customers.
Even assuming that petitioners have vicarious standing to assert potential
customers' rights, it is unavailing to compare a theater open to the public for
a fee, with the private home of Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S., at 568
, and the marital bedroom of Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, at
485-486. This Court, has, on numerous occasions, refused to hold that
commercial ventures such as a motion-picture house are "private" for
the purpose of civil rights litigation and civil rights statutes. See Sullivan
v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229,
236 (1969); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298,
305 -308 (1969); Blow v. North Carolina, 379 U.S. 684,
685 -686 (1965); Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306,
307 -308 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
247 , 260-261 (1964). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 specifically
defines motion-picture houses and theaters as places of "public
accommodation" covered by the Act as operations affecting commerce. 78
Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. 2000a (b) (3), (c).
Our prior decisions recognizing a right to privacy guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment included "only personal rights that can be deemed
`fundamental' or `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937)." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152 (1973). This privacy right encompasses and protects the personal
intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and
child rearing. Cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453 -454 (1972); id., at 460, 463-465 (WHITE, J., concurring);
Stanley v. Georgia, supra, at 568; Loving v. Virginia, [413 U.S. 49,
66] 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, at 486; Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923). Nothing, however, in this Court's decisions intimates
that there is any "fundamental" privacy right "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" to watch obscene movies in places of public
accommodation.
If obscene material unprotected by the First Amendment in itself
carried with it a "penumbra" of constitutionally protected privacy,
this Court would not have found it necessary to decide Stanley on the narrow
basis of the "privacy of the home," which was hardly more than a
reaffirmation that "a man's home is his castle." Cf. Stanley v.
Georgia, supra, at 564. 13 Moreover,
we have declined to equate the privacy of the home relied on in Stanley with a
"zone" of "privacy" that follows a distributor or a
consumer of obscene materials wherever he goes. See United States v. Orito,
post, at 141-143; United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, post, at 126-129;
United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S., at 376
-377 (opinion of WHITE, J.); United States v. Reidel, supra, at 355.
The idea of a "privacy" right and a place of public accommodation
are, in this context, [413 U.S. 49, 67] mutually exclusive.
Conduct or depictions of conduct that the state police power can prohibit on a
public street do not become automatically protected by the Constitution merely
because the conduct is moved to a bar or a "live" theater stage, any
more than a "live" performance of a man and woman locked in a sexual
embrace at high noon in Times Square is protected by the Constitution because
they simultaneously engage in a valid political dialogue.
It is also argued that the State has no legitimate interest in
"control [of] the moral content of a person's thoughts," Stanley v.
Georgia, supra, at 565, and we need not quarrel with this. But we reject the
claim that the State of Georgia is here attempting to control the minds or
thoughts of those who patronize theaters. Preventing unlimited display or
distribution of obscene material, which by definition lacks any serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value as communication, Miller v.
California, ante, at 24, 34, is distinct from a control of reason and the
intellect. Cf. Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972);
Roth v. United States, supra, at 485-487; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101
-102 (1940); Finnis, "Reason and Passion": The
Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 222,
229-230, 241-243 (1967). Where communication of ideas, protected by the First
Amendment, is not involved, or the particular privacy of the home protected by
Stanley, or any of the other "areas or zones" of constitutionally
protected privacy, the mere fact that, as a consequence, some human
"utterances" or "thoughts" may be incidentally affected
does not bar the State from acting to protect legitimate state interests. Cf.
Roth v. United States, supra, at 483, 485-487; Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S., at 256
-257. The fantasies of a drug addict are his own and beyond the
reach of government, but government regulation of drug sales is not [413
U.S. 49, 68] prohibited by the Constitution. Cf. United States v. Reidel,
supra, at 359-360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Finally, petitioners argue that conduct which directly involves
"consenting adults" only has, for that sole reason, a special claim
to constitutional protection. Our Constitution establishes a broad range of
conditions on the exercise of power by the States, but for us to say that our Constitution
incorporates the proposition that conduct involving consenting adults only is
always beyond state regulation, 14 is
a step we are unable to take. 15 Commercial
exploitation of depictions, descriptions, or exhibitions of obscene conduct on
commercial premises open to the adult public falls within a State's broad power
to regulate commerce and protect the public [413 U.S. 49,
69] environment. The issue in this context goes beyond whether
someone, or even the majority, considers the conduct depicted as
"wrong" or "sinful." The States have the power to make a
morally neutral judgment that public exhibition of obscene material, or
commerce in such material, has a tendency to injure the community as a whole,
to endanger the public safety, or to jeopardize, in Mr. Chief Justice Warren's
words, the States' "right . . . to maintain a decent society."
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S., at 199
(dissenting opinion).
To summarize, we have today reaffirmed the basic holding of Roth
v. United States, supra, that obscene material has no protection under the
First Amendment. See Miller v. California, supra, and Kaplan v. California,
post, p. 115. We have directed our holdings, not at thoughts or speech, but at
depiction and description of specifically defined sexual conduct that States
may regulate within limits designed to prevent infringement of First Amendment
rights. We have also reaffirmed the holdings of United States v. Reidel, supra,
and United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, supra, that commerce in obscene
material is unprotected by any constitutional doctrine of privacy. United
States v. Orito, post, at 141-143; United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film,
post, at 126-129. In this case we hold that the States have a legitimate
interest in regulating commerce in obscene material and in regulating
exhibition of obscene material in places of public accommodation, including
so-called "adult" theaters from which minors are excluded. In light
of these holdings, nothing precludes the State of Georgia from the regulation
of the allegedly obscene material exhibited in Paris Adult Theatre I or II,
provided that the applicable Georgia law, as written or authoritatively
interpreted by the Georgia courts, meets the First Amendment standards set
forth in Miller v. California, ante, at 23-25. The [413 U.S. 49,
70] judgment is vacated and the case remanded to the Georgia Supreme
Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion and Miller v.
California, supra. See United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, post, at 130
n. 7.
.
Vacated and remanded.
.