471 U.S. 858 (1985)
Justice Stevens delivered
the opinion of the Court.
The question presented
is whether 18 U.S.C. S 844(i) applies to a two-unit apartment building
that is used as rental property.
Petitioner owns an apartment
building located at 4530 South Union, Chicago, Illinois. He earned rental
income from it and treated it as business property for tax purposes. In
early 1983, he made an unsuccessful attemptto set fire to the building
and was consequently indicted for violating S 844(i).
Following a bench trial,
petitioner was convicted and sentenced to 10 yearsimprisonment. The District
Court and the Court of Appeals both rejected his contention that the building
was not commercial or business property, and therefore was not capable
of being the subject of an offense under S 844(i).
Section 844(i) used broad language to define the offense. It provides:
Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts
to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle,
or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce
or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned
for not more than ten years or fined not more than $10,000, or both. .
. .
The reference to "any building
. . . used . . . in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce"
expresses an intent by Congress to exercise its full power under the Commerce
Clause.
The legislative
history indicates that Congress intended to exercise its full power to
protect "business property." Moreover, after considering whether the bill
as originally introduced would cover bombings of police stations or churches,
the bill was revised to eliminate the words "for business purposes" from
the description of covered property. Even after that change, however, the
final Report on the bill emphasized the "very broad" coverage of "substantially
all business property." In the floor debates on the final bill, although
it was recognized that the coverage of the bill was extremely broad, the
Committee Chairman, Representative Celler, expressed the opinion that "the
mere bombing of a private home even under this bill would not be covered
because of the question whether the Congress would have the authority under
the Constitution." In sum, the legislative history suggests that Congress
at least intended to protect all business property, as well as some additional
property that might not fit that description, but perhaps not every private
home.
By its terms, however,
the statute only applies to property that is "used" in an "activity" that
affects commerce. The rental of real estate is unquestionably such an activity.
We need not rely on the connection between the market for residential units
and "the interstate movement of people," to recognize that the local rental
of an apartment unit is merely an element of a much broader commercial
market in rental properties. The congressional power to regulate the class
of activities that constitute the rental market for real estate includes
the power to regulate individual activity within that class.
Petitioner was renting
his apartment building to tenants at the time he attempted to destroy it
by fire. The property was therefore being used in an activity affecting
commerce within the meaning of 5 844(i).
The judgment of the Court
of Appeals is affirmed.