UPJOHN CO v. UNITED STATES
449 U.S. 383 (1981)
JUSTICE
RENQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Upjohn CO.
manufactures and sells Pharmaceuticals here and abroad. In January 1976
independent accountants conducting an audit of one of Upjohn's foreign
subsidiaries discovered that the subsidiary made payments to or for the benefit
of foreign government officials in order to secure government business. The
accountants so informed petitioner Mr. Gerard Thomas, Upjohn's Vice President,
Secretary, and General Counsel. Thomas is a member of the Michigan and New York
Bars, and has been Upjohn's General Counsel for 20 years. He consulted with
outside counsel and R. T. Parfet, Jr., Upjohn's Chairman of the Board. It was
decided that the company would conduct an internal investigation of what were
termed "questionable payments." As part of this investigation the
attorneys prepared a letter containing a questionnaire which was sent to
"All Foreign General and Area Managers" over the Chairman's signature.
The letter began by noting recent disclosures that several American companies
made "possibly illegal" payments to foreign government officials and
emphasized that the management needed full information concerning any such
payments made by Upjohn. The letter indicated that the Chairman had asked
Thomas, identified as "the company's General Counsel," "to
conduct an investigation for the purpose of determining the nature and
magnitude of any payments made by the Upjohn Company or any of its subsidiaries
to any employee or official of a foreign government." The questionnaire
sought detailed information concerning such payments. Managers were instructed
to treat the investigation as "highly confidential" and not to
discuss it with anyone other than Upjohn employees who might be helpful in
providing the requested information. Responses were to be sent directly to
Thomas. Thomas and outside counsel also interviewed the recipients of the
questionnaire and some 33 other Upjohn officers or employees as part of the investigation.
On March 26, 1976, the
company voluntarily submitted a preliminary report to the Securities and
Exchange Commission on Form 8-K disclosing certain questionable payments. A
copy of the report was simultaneously submitted to the Internal Revenue
Service, which immediately began an investigation to determine the tax
consequences of the payments. Special agents conducting the investigation were
given lists by Upjohn of all those interviewed and all who had responded to the
questionnaire. On November 23, 1976, the Service issued a summons pursuant to
26 U. S. C. S 7602 demanding production of..
All
files relative to the investigation conducted under the supervision of Gerard
Thomas to identify payments to employees of foreign governments
and any political contributions made by the Upjohn
Company or any of its affiliates since January 1, 1971 and to determine whether
any funds of the Upjohn Company had been improperly accounted for on the
corporate books during the same period.
The records should include but not be
limited to written questionnaires sent to managers of the Upjohn Company's
foreign affiliates, and memorandums or notes of the interviews conducted in the
United States and abroad with officers and employees of the Upjohn Company and
its subsidiaries.
The
company declined to produce the documents specified in the second paragraph on
the grounds that they were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client
privilege and constituted the work product of attorneys prepared in anticipation
of litigation. On August 31, 1977. the United States filed a Petition seeking
enforcement of the summons . . . in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan. That court adopted the recommendation of a
Magistrate who concluded that the summons should be enforced. Petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which rejected the
Magistrate's finding of a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, but agreed
that the privilege did not apply to the extent that the communications were
made by officers and agents not responsible for directing Upjohn's actions in
response to legal advice . . . for the simple reason that the communications
were not the 'client's.' " The court reasoned that accepting petitioners'
claim for a broader application of the privilege would encourage upper-echelon
management to ignore unpleasant facts and create too broad a "zone of
silence." Noting that Upjohn’s counsel had interviewed officials
such as the Chairman and President, the Court of Appeals remanded to the
District Court so that a determination of who was within the "control
group" could be made. . . .
Federal
Rule of Evidence 501 provides that "the privilege of a witness . . . shall
be governed by the principles of the common law as they may he interpreted by
the courts of the United States in light of reason and experience." The
attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential
communications known to the common law. Its purpose is to encourage full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being
fully informed by the client.
In the case of the individual
client the Provider of information and the person who acts on the lawyer's
advice are one and the same. In the corporate context, however, it will
frequently be employees beyond the control group as defined by the court
below--officers and agents . . . responsible
for
directing [the company's] actions in response to legal advice" - who will possess
the information needed by the corporation's lawyers’ Middle-level
and
indeed lower-level_employees can, by actions within the scope of their employment,
embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties, and it is only natural
that these employees would have the relevant information needed by corporate
counsel if he is adequately to advise the client with respect to such actual or
potential difficulties.
The control group test
adopted by the court below thus frustrates the very purpose of the privilege by
discouraging the communication of relevant information by employees of the
client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation. The
attorney's advice will also frequently be more significant to non-control group
members than to those who officially sanction the advice, and the control group
test makes it more difficult to convey full and frank legal advice to the
employees who will put into effect the client corporation's policy. . . .
The narrow scope given the
attorney-client privilege by the court below not only makes it difficult for
corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice ..hen their client is faced with
a specific legal problem but also threatens to limit the valuable efforts of
corporate counsel to ensure their client's compliance with the law. In light of
the vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation confronting the modern
corporation, corporations, unlike most individuals, "constantly go to
lawyers to find out how to obey the law," particularly since compliance
with the law in this area is hardly an instinctive matter. . . .
The communications at issue
were made by Upjohn employees to counsel for Upjohn acting as such, at the
direction of corporate superiors in order to secure legal advice from counsel.
. . . Information, not available from upper-echelon management, was needed to
supply a basis for legal advice concerning compliance with securities and tax
laws, foreign laws, currency regulations, duties to shareholders, and potential
litigation in each of these areas. The communications concerned matters within
the scope of the employees' corporate duties, and the employees themselves were
sufficiently aware that they were being questioned in order that the
corporation could obtain legal advice. . . . Consistent with the underlying
purposes of the attorney client privilege, these communications must be
protected against compelled disclosure.
Accordingly, the judgment of
the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further
proceedings.